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I~ THE SUPREME COURT OF TRE STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN P. CONDAS, GEORGE P. 
CONDAS, HARRY P. CONDAS, 
'1ARGARITA CREGLOW ELLIS 
and TESSIE MADSEN, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
GEORGE J. CONDAS, :1ARY 
CONDAS LEK~ER, CHRIS J. 
CONDAS, NICK J. CONDAS, 
ELLEN CONDAS BAYAS, 
ALEXA~DRA CG:'lDAS OCKEY and 
J. CONDAS CORPORATION, a 
Utah corporation, 
Defendants and Ap~ellants. 
CASE NO. 15,669 
REPLY BRIEF OF DEFE:JDA~TS-APPELLANTS 
The Brief of Respondents fails to squarely address the 
1ssues of admissibility in evidence of a8s~~ac~ed portions of 
selected testimony from the Abstract of Record in the Sullivan 
v. Condas case (Salt La~e County Civil No. ~2140 - Supreme 
Court Case :io. 4922). Likewise the Brief of Respondents 
erroneously assumes that the pleadi~gs and Brief of John G. 
Condas in the Sullivan v. Condas case are declarations against 
interest and/or judic1al admissions and are binding on 
appellants in this case. Furthermore, the Brief of Respondents 
wholly fails to address its burden of oroof by clear and 
convincing e•.ridence that a r:Jublic roadway ·,.;as established over 
appellants' lands. 
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The import of respondents' approach is to brush over 
the inescapable conclusion that the competent evidence in 
this case simply will not support the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of the court below. Accordingly 
the Brief of Respondents cannot go unchallenged. In this 
Reply Brief appellants will endeavor to address the more 
serious deficiencies and will strive to avoid "nit-picking". 
REPLY TO POiil'T I 
The real problem with the testimony of the witnesses 
who testified in the Sullivan v. Condas case is the form in 
which it was offered in this case, ie. abstracted portions 
of selected testimony from the Abstract of Record. Respondent 
glosses over these fatal deficiencies by relying on loss of 
the transcript and suggesting that the circumstances under 
which it was prepared argue forcibly for its accuracy. Here 
respondents' proof consisted of selected abstracted portions of 
the testimony. Yet the substance of the whole testimony on 
the particular point or issue involved in the previous trial 
including both testimony given on direct examination and tes-
timony given on cross-examination must be proved, even though 
the identical words need not be reproduced. Annotation: 
11 A.L.R. 2d 30, §32, p. 112; 29 Arn.Jur. 2d Evidence, §762 
p. 832. The reason for the rule is obvious since how else 
could the trier of the fact or the court on appeal weigh and 
Jive fair consideration t~ the test_mc~y without knowi c :h~ 
whole of the substance thereof given both on direct examinat1on 
and cross-examination? 
- 2 -
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For the reasons stated above and those in appellants' 
primary brief which remain unanswered in respondents' brief, 
it is respectfully submitted that it was error for the trial 
court to receive into evidence the abstracted portions of 
selected testimony and to base its findings thereon was 
reversible error. 
REPLY TO POINT II 
Respondents wholly ignore the difference between a 
"declaration against interest'' and an "admission" and loosely 
use the terms interchangeably. Likewise, respondents do not 
distinguish between "admissions by parties" or "authorized 
and adoptive admissions" or "vicarious admissions" and ,:q·ain 
use the terms interchangeably. 
are different. 
Yet the rules applicable thereto 
Suffice it to say the only statenents of John G. Condas 
in the Sullivan v. Condas case which might be admissible in 
this case are his declarations of fact against his interest 
given in his testimony therein under the exception contained 
in Rule 63(10), U.R.:::. A careful reading of the abstracted 
portion of his testimony reveals no statement or declaration 
by him of a public roadway uo lfuite Pine Canyon through his 
;:Jroperty. 
The pleadings and brief of John G. Condas in the 
Sullivan v. Condas case, even though authorized by him, are 
ex c l u ci e d f rom '\ u l e ·) 3 ( 9 ) , C . :\ . - . under the authority c~:ed 
in appellants' primar~· brr.ef and clearly do not fall l.;'ithin 
- 3 -
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the exceptions contained in Rules 63(7) and 63(8), U.R.E. 
Again, it was error for the trial court to receive the same 
in evidence and it was reversible error for the trial court 
to base its findings thereon. 
REPLY TO POINT III 
Respondents' whole argument under this point is 
founded on the erroneous assumption that the decision of 
the Intermediate Court of Appeals of Arizona in 11echam v. 
City of Glendale, 489 P.2d 65, 15 Ariz. App. 402 (1971), 
is the law in Utah. There Mecham prevailed in the prior 
litigation against his contract seller Owens in breach of 
contract by relying on the validity of the city's abandonment 
of the roadway. In the subsequent litigation asainst the 
city, Mecham was estopped from asserting invalidity of the 
abandonment which had been decided in his favor in the 
prior litigation. 
In Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113, 485 P.2d 1044 
(1971), which is the law in Utah, this court held that 
collateral estoppel applies where issues which are actually 
decided against a party in a prior action may be relied 
upon by an opponent in a later case as having been judicially 
established. Furthermore, this court there emphasized that 
the issue had to be decided against the party in the prlor 
litigation and in so doing rejects the rationale of Mecham 
v. ~ity of Glen~~le, sup=a, as being t~e .aw in U:3.1. Here 
the court below adopted the rationale of Mecham v. Citv of 
- 4 -
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Gle~dale, s~~ra, as the basis ~or its application of collateral 
estoppel ~8 the ~acts of this case and in so doing committed 
reve~sible e~~~r. 
I:-1 :Zr.l~:-:t ·:. ?lat ':'op :1i:1ing Comi_)any, 6 Ctah 2d 51, 
305 ?.2d 503 !l?S-:') cited on page 18 of respondents' brief, 
the issue of the validity of certain mining claims was 
conclus::.·:el:; established by a judgment in a prior action 
between locater's of certai:-1 conflicting mining claims and 
this Court held that the Beehive claimants having had an 
opportun1ty to defend their title to their claims in the 
prior case and having failed to do so were precluded from 
litigating the same issues i:-1 the instant case i:1sofar '~ 
the rights of the same parties or their successors were 
concerned. Here the resi_)ondents \vere not parties to Sullivan 
"!.Candas a:1d Kniqht •;. Flat Top :-lining ::::.maar.•:, supra, 
simply does :10t apply. 
In view of the foregoing, the trial court erred in 
its application of the Doctri:1e of Collateral Estoppel to 
the facts of this case as the whole basis for its decision 
and in so doing committed re•1ers1ble error. 
REPLY TO POI~T IV 
Respondents predicate their whole araument under this 
point on the erroneous premise that the Sullivan v. Candas 
case establlshed a publ1c roadway across aopellants' lands 
while it was still a::;>~- of the oubl:; domain. The Findings 
- ~ -
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and Decree in that case specifically and unequivocally limite~ 
the public road from the highway along Trottman's Lane and 
across the lands of Sullivan with the center line specificall; 
described to the gate on his South boundary. 
Thus the language quoted from the opinion of this Court 
in Sullivan v. Condas, 76 Utah 585, 290 Pac. 954 (1930), on 
page 20 of respondents' brief is clearly obiter dictum since 
the appeal there was taken from the Decree which only estab-
lished a public road across the then Sullivan lands. This is 
made more clear by the language of this Court which followed 
the above on the same page (290 Pac. 957), to-wit: 
l-Ie on the record are satisfied that the great 
preponderance of the evidence supports the 
findings that for fifty years prior to the 
commencement of the action, the public generally, 
the defendant and his predecessors in interest, 
used and occupied the roadway to the extent of 
one and one-half rods on each side of the center 
thereof as it passed through the lands of the 
plaintiffs and thelr predecessors ln lnterest, 
openly, contlnuously, unlnteruptedly and under 
claim of right, until wrongfully interfered '.-lith 
by the plaintiffs shortly before the commencement 
of the action, and used, treated, and regarded 
the roadway as a public highway. The roadway to 
such extent was thus decreed to be a public 
highway. (underscoring ours) 
On page 21 of respondents' brief the comment is made 
that counsel for appellants never asked the trial court at 
any time to consider anything from the Sullivan case which 
was not already before it. The facts are that appellants 
repeatedly objected and moved to strike such evidence whlch 
was received by the trial court subject to appellants' ~otion 
- 6 -
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by appellants' witnesses and documentary evidence from 1922 
until the present time. And we note that respondents had 
the burden of proving otherwise in the court below by clear 
and convincing evidence which they wholly failed to do. 
Accordingly, the Findings, Conclusions and Decree of the 
trial court must be set aside and reversed. 
REPLY TO POINT V 
Respondents predicate their whole argument under this 
point on the erroneous premise that a public road had been 
established across appellants' lands while the same were a 
part of the public domain. Sullivan v. Condas, supra, did 
not so decide nor does the competent evidence in this case 
so establish. And since no public road has been so estab-
lished, the decision of the trial court relative to the 
action of the Summit County Commissioners is moot. 
While appellants have no quarrel with the principles 
of law announced in Sullivan v. Condas, supra, as relating 
to the Sullivan lands, those principles have no application 
to appellants' lands herein. That is the legal reason 
which has been repeatedly offered by appellants in this case 
and which is repeatedly ignored by respondents. 
REPLY TO POINT VI 
Respondents complain on page 25 of their Brief that 
the former testimony of deceased witnesses have been ~gnored. 
Appellants make it abundantly clear Jn page 6 of tle~r brl2f 
that the Statement of Facts contained therein is develooed 
- 8 -
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to t~e excL:sio:: o: such evidence since it was inadmissible 
~es?ondents then go on to quote selected 
abst::::-acted testimony o: :::>el ~edden i:::. an attempt to pro?e a 
point and :n so doing point up the very error which results 
there:'::-om. :'~:.1s the abstracted testimony o: Delbert H. 
Redden on page 100 thereo: next preceding respondents' quote 
states 
·~ell, in all ~:! time there I never knew of 
a wagon going :.lp half a m1le above my house, not 
the kind, not a wagon, you understand, a :'our-
~hee~ed ~ago~, I ~~ow of course * * * '' 
A?pe!lants po:nt ~p the above not beca~se it is 
ad:nissJ..jle or s~o'-.:l::: be considered but t:J ,:.e::1c:1s:.rate :.:--.e 
e~ll and ~ischie~ :J~ recelvi~g that ~indo~ evide~ce. ~~E 
seek ~o co~~ound t~a~ error on this a??eal. 
s:Jeak :or <::-.e::~se l·.•e s and ~ t se r·:e s :10 use :'ul purpose to 
s~ec·:...:la.:.e :)n the ·.·:l:.:::.:-: ::): :.~e trail sho'."""!1. :::-tereon or who or 
To sa:_; as respondents do on 
page 26 o: <:heir ::r:e: that the ho!Clestead doc•ments ·,;ere 
not lntended to mean that no road existed in the canyon is 
the rankest k1nd o: speculation. ~nd to s~ggest that the 
homestead papers o: Pete and ~us Condas were prepared by John 
Condas and the::::-e:ore should be interpreted di:'ferentl:_; is 
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while such lands were a part of the public domain or after 
such lands became privately owned. Respondents had the 
burden of proving that issue by clear and convincing evidence. 
Respondents apparently concede that they did not meet their 
burden of proof after appellants' lands passed into private 
ownership. They labeled the post-turn of the century evidence 
as irrelevant and rest their case on Sullivan v. Candas, supra, 
as establishing a public road while appellants' lands were 
a part of the public domain. In so doing respondents' case 
must fail. It is just that simple. 
Respondents allude to the testimony of the witness 
David Street which is of 1950 vintage and is absolutely of 
no help. Suffice it to say the testimony of his superior 
Don H. Peterson places it in proper perspective (R. 879-885, 
incl.). 
While gates and signs do not destroy a public road 
already lawfully established, gates and signs do prevent 
a public road from thereafter being lawfully established 
since such acts negative the requisite intention of the 
landowner to abandon the roadway to the public use. 
Demonstrative of the irreconcilable conflicts which 
permeate the Findings of the trial court that "the public 
continued to use the roadway until it was closed by defendants 
in 1971" (Fdg. 4) is its specific finding that John F. Candas 
constructed "a wooden gate of only suffici2nt width tc 
permit passage of a person riding horseback across the 
- 10 -
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;::asture area" (Fdg. 9). 
a:l :s that based solely on 
lcwer :c~=~ ~=~~~ ~~a~ a ~~b!~c road had been established 
acr:ss a:;::e::a~~s· ;::rcper~~ ~hie~ pre-dated the acquisition 
=~ so =o~~g i~ completely changed 
la~ds o~ acpe::a~~s ~= ~~e =e~eral ;::ub1ic wh~ch has to be 
the re2.ie~ so·..;g~~ ~· apr::e2.la~ts i~ this appeal. 
?espect~_;lly s~bnitted, 
I /// 'Tf. /-
... ------,; •I ,/ < £ '-
J"oseoR ::ovak 
rltto~ney for Defendants and 
.;ooella~ts George J. Condas, 
~~~v Candas Lehmer, Chris J. 
Con~as, ~ick J. Condas, Ellen 
Candas Ba~as and Alexandra 
Cor.das Ocke'/ 
520 Continental Bank Building 
Salt ~ake C~t:·, Ctah 84101 
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